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Central governments  and commnunity  groups have provided  for and delivered water services
throughout  the world. Indeed, both  central control and community  control have long histories. State
development  of irrigation  systems was important  in ancient Mesopotamia,  Egypt, and the Roman
Empire (Said, 1981). The Nile delta was an important source of food from the time of the Pharaohs
to the Roman Empire. And the role of the imperial government in spreading information  concerning
the Nile floods and in developing  irrigation  infrastructure  was considered  crucial for secure food
supplies.
Communal irrigation  systems  have existed for generations in countries  such as Thailand,
India, Sri Lanka, Bali, Indonesia,  the Philippines, and Nepal (Easter, 1986). In the Philippines,  the
"zangjera" system  of cooperative  irrigation  management  dates back to the 1600's (Lewis, 1980).
Water User Organizations  (WUAs)  have existed in Tunisia for most of the 20th century, with the
French Colonial government  establishing  their legal basis in 1913. In Sri Lanka, British  rulers
undermined community  irrigation  systems by abolishing forced labor in 1832  and later by establishing
minor courts that impeded  the authority of village headman (Roberts, 1980). Later, when the
irrigation system failed, traditional  authority was strengthened in a policy reversal.
In pre-Columbian  Latin America, the native empires maintained  central control over complex
irrigation systems. Many of these physical  structures survived colonial  rule but the Spanish imposed  a
system based on individual  water rights that they inherited  from their Moorish tradition  (Lee, 1990).
'  The authors who are both consultants with the World Bank would like to thank Charly Sheerin for his help
in the review  of case studies and Gershon  Feder,  Herve  Plusqueliec, and Ashok Subranmanian  for their comments
on earlier  drafts.2
This decentralized  watei management  lasted into the twentieth century when national  governments
reinstated central authority over water.
This post-c;olonial  nationalism  was replicated in other areas of the developing world. With it
came a trend toward governmental  activism  in economic  affairs. It was belFeved that only the state
was :.apable  of handling  the large investments  and operations necessary  in irrigation  and water supply
systems and that the crucial role of water  justifies government control. Furthermore, international
lending institutions, si'ch as The VWorld  Bank, maintained  policies requiring governmental  i;ivolvement
in the development  loans that financed  water delivery infrastructure.
The fiscal crisis in the developing  world beginning in the early 1980s, however, demonstrated
the weaknesses  of government delivery of water services. The deterioration of irrigation  systems  and
the continued inadequacy  of water supply infrastructure  throughout  the developing world has exposed
the serious institutional  deficiencies  and resulting  government failure in many water resources
agencies. This includes  lack of motivation  and accountability  of agency staff, high levels  of polit.c
interference  and rent seeking, as well as inadequate  concern for the needs of users. Consequently,
without some assurance  that water resources agencies will provide the desired levels of services, users
are not willing to share in the investment,  operations, and maintenance  costs (Easter, 1993).
Although, user and private sector participation  in water management  is not new, the idea has
often been resisted by vested bureaucratic interests and rejeoted  due to lack of confidence  in the
capacity and incentives  of the private sector. Yet, the continued  decline in irrigated agricultural
performance arid  the inadequacy  of water supply systems has brought this top-down approach  under
greater scrutiny. This paper discusses  the transition from central government  control to a more
decentralized  ap,:oach to the delivery of water services. The first section reviews the economics  of
public goods and market failures and provides the conceptual  framework for considering  the relative
roles of government, the private sector, and user groups in water resources management.  This is3
followed by an assesment  of a number of initiatives  promoting  private sector and comrnunity
involvement  in irrigation and water supply management  with examples from Latin America, Africa,
and Asia. All of the examples  demonstrate  the link between participation  or ownership,  and the
improved performance  and sustainability  of the water system.  The paper concludes  that governments
have an important  but changing  role in water management.
A. Public Goods and Market  Failures
There are four types of market failures that are important in the public provision of water
services. They are: nonexcludability,  nonsubtractibility,  externalities,  and n. ural monopolies.
Nonexcludability refers to the difficulty involved  in preventing a non-paying  consumer  from using a
good or service. Private firms do not sufficiently  provide nonexcludable  services because  it is difficult
to prevent non-paying  consumers  from using the service.  Village wells and large gravity-flow
irrigation systems are in many instances  nonexcludable.  Nonsubtractibility  occurs when the use of a
good or service by one individual  does not subtract from its value to another. This occurs when
capital equipment  such as dams, water and sewer pipes, and irrigation canals are not used to full
capacity. When there is little or no cost to society from added utilization,  then expanded  use leads  to
an increase in total economic  welfare.
Excludability  and subtractibility  can be used as a means of classifying  between  public and
private goods and services. Goods and services  that are both excludable  and subtractible  are easily
rationed by price and are classified  as private goods. Publ  goods, in contrast, are characterized  by
X  inexcludability and nonsubtractibility  in consumption  and are difficult  to allocate with market
mechanism. Flood control and instream uses of water are examples  of public goods. Resources  such
as groundwater  that face subtractability  in use and nonexcludability  are generally  called open access
resources.4
Externalities  are the unintended  effecLs  of one party's activities on third parties.  Delivery  of
good quality water is generally  characterized  by positive health externalities  for society. Because  of
this, the market system will tend to underprovide  this service. For instance, since these public hcalth
externalities  are not incorporated  into an individual's  decision to pay for water delivery, the sum of
individual  willingness-to-pay  is less than society's value for potable water.
The construction  of water  systems generally requires large, lumpy investments.  But once the
investments  are made, the marginal  costs of providing service to an additional  patron are quite small.
Because  of these economies  of scale, the delivery of  vater services is in many cases a natural
monopoly. As a result of this market power the organizations  that supply water can prevent
competitors  from entering the market by charging  low prices and then after the competition  is
eliminated, much higher prices can be charged. Thus, governments  have become involved  in
providing and regulating  these service in order to protect citizens  from non-competitive  pricing and
excessive  monopoly  rents.
These market failures imply that competitively  determined  prices may not efficiently  ration
water. Thus public intervention  into the market may be needed, and can be realized  by various types
of institutions. While governments  - as stewards of the public trust - are usually  considered  to be the
most likely candidates  to deliver water services, other institutions  - such as independently  chartered
associations,  public utilities, and community  groups - can fulfill this role. Once members  establish  the
mutual assurance that fellow  users will cooperate  and contribute to system success, less formal users
groups can also function  in this capacity.
However, the sources of market failure do i:ot occur equally in all parts of a water system
(see table 1).  Certain aspects  of water systems can be organized so that market failures are
minimized. T..js separate institutions  or organizations  can be responsible  for different  parts of a
water system (Kessides, 1992). For example,  a government can provide for irrigation  systems  by5
establishing  a suitable ;gal  structure for irrigation  development. It can also provide  the capital and
then contract out the construction  of the irrigation infrastructure  to private firms.  Onze the water
system is completed,  water u sers associations,  or local communities  can operate the system and
deliver the water.  This can introduce  appropriate  incentives, improve accountability,  increase
efficiency, and lower the financial  burden on governments. Similarly, management  by private firms
or financially  autonomous  entities  wan  introduce  many of the same benefits and incentives.
B. Decentralized  Irrigation  Management
In many developing  countries, the state hiLs  provided for, constructed, and operated irrigation
systems according to its needs, with ;ittle cr no cc  nsultation with those who are to be served by the
system. This approach  has resulted  in poor service and irrigation systems  that are not sustainable  over
the long term. Too often, irrigation  agencies  have concentrated on new irrigation  development  at the
expense of system maintenance.  Once built, many agencies are not capable  of performing  the
necessary O&M and farmers are usually  unwilling to accept  the responsibility  for maintaining  the
system when they were not involved  in system planning and development.  Those agencies  that levy a
water charge to pay for O&M have difficulty  collecting it, because farmers are unwilling  to pay for
poor service. Subsequent  government  subsidies  to pay for O&M are often diverted to pay for new
construction.
The inclusion  of farmers in irrigation  management  and even ownership  is seen as a way to
stabilize, if not improve, most irrigation  systems. One approach has been to increase  user
participation  in operation of irrigation  services. This improves  the flow of information,  reduces
monitoring costs, establishes  a sense of ownership in the farmers, and increases  transparency  and
accountability  in decisionmaking. Examples  show, that when the knowledge  and experience  of
farmers is included in the planning  and management  of irrigation  system, its performance  improves6
and they are willing to participate  .n system maintenance.  The participation  of farmers in project
planning and management  provides  them with some assurance  that the system will supply them with
an effective level of service.
Another approach is to establish a legal and economic  climate that encourages  farmers to
develop irrigation  privately. Both conunial  systems and private wells have contributed  significantly
to irrigation development.  In both cases, the users own the system, receive most or the benefits, ard
have to pay most of the costs. This establishes  incentives for efficient water use and farmer
monitoring of performance  that does not exist in many government  operated systems. 2
1. Water User Associations
Modeled  somewhat  after communal  ir-igation systems, governments  have helped establish
WUAs in government  operated irlngation  systems and in some cases transferred ownership  to WUAs.
Two factors have been important  in these efforts by governments  to establish  sustainable  WUAs.
First, the benefits to farmers from cooperation  must be sizeable,  well understood, and considered  by
the community  to be fairly distributed.  Second, the responsibility  and accountability  for system
management  and decision making  including  project finances must be transparent  ard clearly
established. The second condition  provides water users assurance  that other users will pev<orm  their
duties and make contributions  to the system's operation and maintenance.  On;e established,  effective
WUAs reduce the transactions  costs of monitoring, eliminate  the asymmetry  of information  associated
with the principal-agent  problem, lessen the uncertainty in water deliveries, and improve  the link
between farmers' efforts and the benefits  they receive.
2 This paper  terms  all  groups  that  ranage Irrigation  systems  as water  associations.  Some  countries,  however,
refer to them  as Irrigation  Associations  (Philippines)  or Farmer  Irrigation  Associations  (Nepal).7
In tF - Philippine  the National Irrigation Administration  (NIA) has been a leader both in
establishing WUAs and in tuming over irrigation  systems to them. In the mid-1970s  NIA began a
unique participatory approach.  The process was designed around the .ntroduction  of an irrigation
community  organizer into a community  in order to reduce the transaction  costs associated  with
organizing the cooperation  needed  in providing O&M. The organizer ac.s as a catalyst, sh(  ing
farmers how they can benefit from cooperation,  helping thenz  establish responsibility  and
accountability  for O&M, and developing  the mutual assurance  that other users will contribute  their
fair share. Once farmers agree to organize, a legally recognized  WUA is established. In systems with
effective WUAs, the NIA has started a three-stage.  process of contracting  with the WUAs to perform
various levels of O&M. In the first stage, the NiA contracts the WUA to carry out O&M under NIA
supervision. The second stage involves  the WUA in the collection of irrigation  service fees, with
incentives  provided  to achieve  target collection  rates. The final stage involves  the transfer of
responsibility  to the WUAs of all but the main storage, diversion, and conveyance  works. As of
1989, 581 formal contracts  covering 140,000  hectares had been signed with WUAs for main system
O&M and irrigation  service fee collection (World Bank, 199  la).  Only thirty-five  contracts for full
transfer of responsibility  for O&M had been signed. Overall, results have been favorable with the
majority of WUAs fulfilling  their contracts. The one apparent key to the process is the initial
introduction  of a catalyst  to start the process and thereby reduce the transaction  costs of organizing
and helping farmers recognize  the benefits from taking responsibility  for O&MA.
In the early 1980s,  Sri Lanka with the help of a USAID funded Water Management  Project
used the Philippine model of community  organizers to rehabilitate  the Left Bank of the Gal Oya. To
gain the trust of the farmers, the organizers began with groups of farmers along the distribution
channels (Uphoff, et al., 1990)  These groups discussed amongst themselves  their problems  and
communicated  with the irrigation  department  staff. This process has greatly improved  communications8
between farmers and government  irrigation  officials which has increased the farmers assurance  that
irrigation officials will delivec  the promised level of service. Conflict among  farmers has declined
substantially  while system improvement  havb.  provided greater water supplies for tailenders,  Careful
to separate their organizations  from partv pol .cs, the farmers h.ve also eased ethnic tensions. In one
area, cooperating  farmers cleared a canal allowing  the dry seasoa cultivation  of 1,000 hectares which
had previously  been left fallow. This benefitted  over 300 ,anilies and demonstrated  that participation
and cooperation  can providv substantial  benefits  and that the farmers have a strong concern for
fairness.
Much like Sri Lank° and the Philippines,  Ehe  government of Indonesia  has instituted  a policy
to turnover small-scale  irrigation systems  of under 500 hectares to WUAs. This was supported by the
World Bank funded Irrigation Sub-Sector  Project (ISSP). The WUAs were granted formal legal status
to enable ihem to take on management  responsibilities.  The government carefully  prepared the
turnover process by bringing  in the farmers for discussions  about rehabilitation  and redesign  so as to
provide farmers with a sense of ownership  and responsibility.  The International  Irrigation
Management  Institute studied two pilot turnover  projects under the ISSP and found that, overall, the
maintenance  performed was more or less what was required with no long-term threat to deterioration
of the canals (Burns and Atmanto, 1992). By the middle of 1991, the government  had transferred
over 400 irrigation  systems covering 34,000 hectares to WdJAs.  Success  for the program relies on
early inclusion  of farmers in the design and construction  phase with flexiuiity in the formation  of
WUAs.
In Ne al a somewhat  different approach  was used to establish accountability  and responsibility
in irrigation system management.  Farmer-managed  irrigation  schemes have been a long tradition in
Nepal, with 70 percent of all irrigation under farmer control.  However, more recently, the
government has been heavily involved  in managing  new irrigation  systems with poor results.9
Consequently,  the government  shifted its approach anid  promoted farmer management  as a way to
improve irrigation performance  and to reduce the financial burden to the government  for irrigation
development  and operations. To support the new approach, the World Bank financed  the Irrigation
Line of Credit (ILC) Pilot Project with resources totaling close to US$20 million  (Reidinger  and
Ga.tarn, 1992). The ILC pilot project funded small- and medium-sL  -d surface and groundwater
schemes to be owned, cperated, and maintained  by legaily recognized  WUAs. The WUA must
request the irrigation investment,  contribute  to capital costs, and accept full responsibility  for O&M
upon completion  of construction.
In the first two years of operation, forty-three ILC surface subprojects  were completed  cut of
a total of sixty-one  subprojects  processed and approved for implementation,  and eighty-one  tubewells
were drilled. Altogether,  these subprojects  serve an area of some 3,400 hectares and about 4,500
households in eight districts. Initial success of the project was due to the enthusiastic  cooperation  of
the farmers and the substantial  benefits  they derive from reliable irrigation water. The WUA
ownership and oversight improved  the quality of construction,  adding a much needed element  of
transparency and assurance  concerning  the use of governmental  resources. The WUAs created
accountability  and assurance  through strong organizations  with good cost recovery and penalties  on
members who fail to abide by the rules (Reidinger  and Gautam, 1992). However, motivated  by the
fear of future loses in rents, the government  has now withdrawn  its support for this approach which
has resulted in its demise.
The Argentina  experience  in forming large WUAs highlights a further potential
benefit from WUAs. The traditional irrigation  in Mendoza  were 100 to 500 ha. in size and were not
able to take advantage  of some of the economies  of scale associated  with large systems. This
situation changed when the WUAs were able to merge into large ones of 5,000 to 15,000  ha. which
allowed them to take advantage  of economies  of scale and utilize professional  management  to manage10
water delivery, cost recovery, and system maintenance.  The administrative  costs are now lower and
conveyance  efficiency  has been increased  by 10 percent through more efficient  water distribution.
Twenty-one  new organizations  have been formed covering over  200,000 ha. Ea:zh  organization  is
autonomous,  raises its own budget  and issues its own regulations in accordance  with the recently
enacted water law (Chambouleyon,  1989).  The WUA's autonomy  and direct hiring of professional
management  have provided  the necessary  accountability  and assurance concerning  operations  of the
irrigation systems while also producing  significant  cost savings.
Colombia provides another  example  of effective large WUAs. The management  of two
irrigation districts, the Coello (27,187 hectares) and the Saldana (13,985 hectares), was transferred to
the WUAs. The WUAs maintain  detailed  and comprehensive  rules, with elected  officials and active
participation  by farmers. A 1989  evaluation  by World Bank staff of the Coello district found the
system well-equipped  and managed  with sophisticated  technology. Operation  and maintenance  is
covered through both fixed and volumetric  charges, with the fixed rates covering 50 percent of O&M
costs (Plusquellec, 1989). Fixed and volumetric  charges cover nearly 85 percent of expenses, with the
remainder coming from equipment  rentals, bank interest, and other charges. The success of the
system is due to a dynamic farming  sector, a high level of farmer training, continuity  and
accountability  of staff, simplified  and transparent operations, and regular maintenance.  This provides
the farmers with the needed assurances  and sizeable irrigation benefits.
2. Well Irrigation
In many areas groundwater  is the major source for irrigation water supplies. Possibly  the
most extensive use of groundwater  resources is in South Asia, particularly in India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh. Here, the nation often was the initial investor in tubewell development.  But it was unable
to provide the appropriate  O&M for the tubewells, causing them to fall into disrepair and disuse.11
Farmers invested  in tubewells in spite of the nation, with greater success. Major concerns  with this
private well development  include  the possibility  of aquifer depletion, because of the open access
nature of the groundwater  resource, local monopoly  pricing, and the inability of private owners  to
integrate surface and groundwater  management.  Farmers with the larger holdings and access  to capital
have been the typical owners of tubewells.  However, water markets have become common  in areas
with private tubewells, and poor farmers are willing to buy water, often paying high prices, rather
than rely on state tubewells. Examples  from Bangladesh  and Pakistan illustrate  how governments  can
change their emphasis  on public sector irrigation  and effectively  promote private sector  development.
In addition, an example  of private groundwater  development  in the Deccan Plateau of India shows
how unregulated  open access  to groundwater  can create serious problems.
Public investment  in tubewells  has a long history in Pakistan. The Salinity Control  and
Reclamation  Project (SCARP), begun in the 1950s, was designed  to reduce waterlogging  and salinity
problems. Over time, problems  of poor maintenance,  inefficient installation  and management  began  to
emerge. The pumping  capacity  of SCARP  tubewells declined  an average of 4 percent annually, with
205 percent of the tubewells  not operating at any one time (World Bank, 1984). SCAR- tubewells
account for about 10 percent of irrigation  water supplies, vet require 55 percent of the total O&M
expenditures in the irrigation  sector.
The inadequacies  of the SCARP  tubewells, along with the demonstrated  benefits  of tubewell
investment,  provided incentives  for private sector investment.  Originally, private sector involvement
came with no encouragement  by the government.  Slowly, beginning in the 1W60s,  the government
began to liberalize  imports of the necessary  equipment. Over the following  two decades, while
continuing  SCARP investment,  the government  also encouraged  more private investment  through
increased credit availability,  fuel subsidies, and an extension  of the electrical grid. Between 1964  and12
1976, private tubewell  use grew by around 38 percent annually. By 1990, over 250,000  private
tubewells had been installed  in the country, as opposed to approximately  13,000 SCARP  tubewells.
The performance  of private tubewells  has been far superior to SCARP tubewells.  About 90
percent of the private tubewells  are operating at any one time, with a shorter down time because  the
beneficiaries (farmers)  now have responsibility  for all O&M and as a result there has been a growth
in small repair shops and availability  of spare parts. Most are shallow tubewells,  which are more
appropriate for the individual  farmer. These tubewells allow farmers better control over the timing
and use of supplemental  irrigation  water. Private tubewell development  has replaced  public investment
at both a savings to society and a benefit to farmers.
Similarly in Bangladesh,  up until the mid-seventies,  tubewell  development  was mostly
performed by the public sector through the Bangladesh  Agricultural  Development  Corporation
(BADC). BADC rented, at heavily subsidized  prices, deep tubewells, shallow tubewells  (STWs), and
low-lift pumps (LLPs). The supply  system, however, was  limited and inefficient  with the equipment
neglected due to a shortage  of parts and qualified  maintenance  personnel.  As the system deteriorated,
the World Bank encouraged  the Government  of Bangladesh  (GOB)  to allow  private sector investment
in the irrigation sector.
Beginning  in the late 1970s  and early 1980s, GOB began to eliminate  many  of the subsidies
and import restrictions on agricultural  inputs and minor irrigation  equipment.  This enabled  the private
sector to compete with the BADC. Sales of STWs rose from 4,485 in 1980  to over 39,000 in 1983
(World Bank, 1990b). Hand-operated  tubewell sales rose dramatically  from 763 in 1980  to over
90,000 in 1984. All sales decreased  with the reimposition  of import and setting restriction  in 1985,
but rebounded  when the government  loosened  all restrictions after the floods in 1988. Between 1988
and 1989 there was a 22 percent rise in the use of STWs and LLPs. By the end of the eighties, the
private sector had virtually  taken over the STW and LLP market.13
As in Pakistan, the majority  of the ow ers of STWs are medium  to large landholders. Yet the
substantial  growth in STWs  has benefitted  the small landholder  through a more active water market.
In one World Bank funded project area it was found that for each STW owner, there were about
fourteen water purchasers. A Bank study found that for each hectare irrigated by an STW owner,
water purchasers irrigated  another 2 hectares. At present, Bangladesh  apparently  has ample quantities
of groundwater  to supply a continuing  growth in tubewells.
Private wells development  has also become increasingly  popular in India and has been
strongly encouraged  by government  policies. The government  has provided low interest loans,
through the National Bank for Agriculture  and Rural Development  (NABARD),  for the purchase  of
pumps. In addition, a flat rate for electricity  use was introduced in 1982. The result was rapid
exploitation  of the available  water with electric pumps. Since farmers with electric pumps do not face
a marginal cost for the open access  groundwater  that they pump, there is no incentive  to conserve
water. Furthermore, farmers can sell pumped  water to neighbors who do not own their own pumps at
prices below the margina. social cost. The result has been a rapid decline in the water table in a
number of areas. For example  ,in parts of the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka  the average water
table level dropped from only 25 to over 160 feet below the surface (Chandrakanth  and Romrn,
1990). These declining  water tables greatly increase the cost of pumping, cause the failure of many
shallow wells, and result in an ecological  imbalance in environmentally  sensitive areas. Thus
unrestricted  private tubewell  development  can have a significant  negative  effects overtime. This could
be corrected by establishing  tradeable  groundwater  rights or by effectively  regulating  well installation
and withdrawal rates.
C.  Decentralized Delivery of Water Supply
In many developing  countries  the performance  of the water supply delivery organizations  is
poor, with maintenance  a chronic  problem. Many water supply systems are plagued by high levels of14
unaccounted-for-water  (UFW)  due to leaks, old pipes, illegal connections, and a lack of meters. In
industrialized  countries, UFW values are about 10 to 15 percent . net production  while a World
Bank study found UFW losses in most Latin American cities ranging from 20 to 50 percent of net
production (Yepes, 1992). The revenue losses  resulting from these high UFW losses represent  an
important potential source of funds to improve O&M. In Bogota, the revenue losses  have been
estimated  to be equivalent  to 25 percent of total billings. "If captured, these financial resources would
have been more than adequate  to meet all debt service obligations  (UIS$195  million) during this
period." In Mexico  City, the authorities  have no "credible  plan to meter consumption,  maintain
meters, and reduce the number  of illegal connections.  The magnitude  of this neglect, coupled with
low rates, requires a federal subsidy  in excess of US$1 billion a year (0.6 percent of GDP), an
equivalent to the annual sector investment  needed to supply the total population  of Mexico  with
adequate water and sanitation  services by the end of this century" (Yepes, 1992  p.v.).
As noted in the introduction,  establishing  institutional  and regulatory arrangements  that foster
efficient water supply systems is complicated  by the potential for natural monopolies  in the collection,
purification, and delivery of water. In addition, large numbers of households, many poor, still lack
access to decent water supplies, although  they have a substantial  willingness  to pay for a domestic
water supply as shown by what they pay private water vendor (World Bank, 1992). One way
governments  can impiove and extend water supplies is through a program in which the government
provides capital for and regulates water supply services while construction  is done by private firms
and private entities  or user groups operate the  facilities. In this way, urban and rural communities
can reduce government failure while limiting market failures.15
1. Urban Water Supply
Three types of arrangements  for decentralizing  water management  that are being used in
urban areas include: service contracts, lease contracts, and concessionaire  contracts. With service
contracts, a public water company  engages  a private firm to produce specific operational  services  such
as meter reading, billing and collections, and operating facilities. Under a lease contract a private firm
rents the facilities from a public authority and assumes responsibility  for operations  and maintenance.
The lessee finances working capital and replacement  of capital components  with a limited economic
life, while the public authority is responsible  for fixed assets. With concessionaire  contracts, a private
firm finances fixed asset investments,  in addition, to working capital. Assets are owned by the firm
for the period of the concession  and are transferred back to the public authority at the end of this
period (Yepes, 1992). These arrangements  are already observed in different developing  countries  and
are designed to use competitive  market forces to improve the deliver of water services. Three recent
examples highlight these approaches.
In 1977, EMOS, the water utility for Santiago, Chile, began to encourage its employees  to
leave the company  and form private firms that would bid for service contracts. Contracts  were
awarded for one to two years under competitive  bidding for meter reading, maintenance  of the pipe
network, billing, vehicle leasing, and more. This approach reduced public employment  and costs,
shortened response  time and provided better service. EMOS is now one of the most efficient  public
water supply companies  in the region in terms of number of staff per population served.
Guinea which began  to restructure its water supply sector in 1987  has used leasing contracts
to supply water to its principal  cities. This has improved  the financial conditions  of the utility
responsible for delivering water and collecting  charges. Early results are favorable with collections  up
from 15 percent to 70 percent (World Bank, 1992).16
In the past 25 years, the urban water sector in the Cote d 'Ivoire has been operated by a
private company, Societe de Distribution  d'Eau de Cote d'lvoire (SODECI), under a mixture of
concessions  and lease contracts (Briscoe  and De Ferranti, 1988). In 1960, SODECI  was established  as
a subsidiary of a large, French water utility, to operate the water supply system of  Abidjan  under a
concession  contract. Subsequently,  the majority  of the equity was acquired by Ivorian  shareholders,
and the shares are traded on the Abidjan  stock exchange. In 1974 SODECI's contract  was extended  to
include three new elements: a lease contract  for the O&M of all urban and rural water supply outside
the capital; a concession  contract  for Abidjan  including investment  in boreholes, as well as the O&M
of the system; and a maintenance  contract  for Abidjan's sewerage and drainage. SODECI collected
the approved tariff from consumers, deducted  its fees due under the contracts, and transferred  the
remainder  to the two public funds in the water and sanitation  sector. Until the arrangements  were
changed in 1987, SODECI  took on limited commercial  risk, because it was compensated  for any
shortfall between actual and projected  sales (Triche, 1990a).
By 1989, 72 percent of the urban population had access to safe water, compared with 30
percent in 1974. About 80 percent of the rural population were served by wells equipped  with
handpumps, compared with 10 percent in 1974 (though many  of them were not in working  order).
There was a high level of operating  efficiency  in urban areas, with unaccounted-for-water  at 12
percent and the collection rate for private consumers at 98 percent.
2. Rural Water  Supply
The link between conimunity  participation  in project development,  user responsibility  for
O&M, and quality of service  has been demonstrated  by the success of a many rural water supply
programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Several donors, including UNDP, have been involved
in community-managed  rural water supply  projects. Programs in Colombia, Malawi, Paraguay, Kenya17
and Bangladesh,  are examples  of community  managed systems with limited government  support. All
five programs have developed  mechanisms,  such as the community  organizers to reduce  the
transaction cost of organizing. In Kenya and Bangladesh,  the organizers made successful  special
efforts to involve women who are the primary managers of water for domestic uses. To establish
accountability  and assurance  in the communities,  each project required a major community
commitment  for building as well as operating  and maintaining  their water system. The communities
must then deal with any excludability  problerr6  or free rider that may arise.
Colombia  has the reputation  of having  the best rural water supply program in Latin America.
By 1980, 80% of the rural population  in Colombia had access to safe water (Briscoe  and De Ferranti,
1988). This is mainly due to a program, developed by the National Institute of Public Health  (INS),
which encourages  community-managed  water systems. In each phase of this program the
responsibilities  of the INS and the community  are clearly spelled out and transparent. The INS
provides design standards, instruction  materials, and technical assistance  for maintenance  problems.
Also, an INS promoter helps the community  organize the system's Administrative  Committee,  and
audits the Committees' ledgers  to assure that they are the financially  accountable.  With this restricted
government support, the contribution  of the local community  is quite different from mere "cost
recovery". The community  participates  in project design, elects the Administrative  Committee,  raises
funds through social activities, and provides materials, labor, transport, and cash for construction.
The Administrative  Committee  operates, maintains, and regulates the system.
Malawi's program is very similar to that of Colombia. It started in a community  of 2,000
people and has been replicated throughout  the country. Currently, community  owned, maintained,  and
operated rural water systems provide  one million  people with safe, reliable, and convenient  service.
Although ideally suited for small-scale,  labor-intensive,  gravity systems, this program is now being
adapted to serve communities  reliant on groundwater  supplies. Governmental  responsibility  includes:18
promoting community  organization,  conducting  necessary  hydrological  and topographic  studies,
raising external funds, providing  the engineering  designs and standards, assisting  in construction,  and
contributing  technical services for maintenance  (Briscoe de Ferranti, 1988). To further reduce the
transaction costs of developing  water supplies, government staff train community  leaders in technical
and organizational  skills. The villagers organize themselves in order to: participate  in project design
and planning, contribute  data to pre-project  studies, provide labor for project construction,  and
operate and maintain the system.
In 1977 the World Bank approved  the first of two loans for rural water supply and sanitation
projects in Paraguay. Over the next thirteen years, the two projects have served 98 poor rural
communities  of between  400 to 4,000 people (over 250,000 in total) (World  Bank, 1991a and 1987).
In these projects, the communities  are responsible  for all O&M and pay a portion of the construction
costs. To receive support, a community  must form a committee,  or junta, and agree to contribute  a
minimum of 22 percent of investment  cost, that is, 10 percent in cash and labor during construction
and the remainder as long-term debt (with interest). The fees are set with a  concern  for fairness since
the socioeconomic  level of the community  is taken into account. But the fee still must cover debt
payment and O&M, and also contribute  to a fund for major repairs and replacement  parts.
While there were delays in implementing  the projects, mainly due to weaknesses  at the
government rural water supply agency, the projects have been an overall successful.  The juntas are
motivated, function well, and manage the systems satisfactorily. The fee structures  appear to be fair
and affordable. By 1985, nearly all of the juntas that were formed under the first project had budget
surpluses. Results from the second  project show total contributions  ranging from 18 to 68 percent
(weighted  average of 50 percent) of investment  costs.
In the southern coastal area of Kenya, the World Bank teamed up with UNDP and its affiliate
agency, PROWWESS  (the Promotion  of the Role of Women in Water Supply and Environment19
Sanitation  Services) to provide  access for the poor to safe water supplies. Beginning  in 1983, the
project developed and installed  hand pumps in rural communities.  Early problems  prompted  the
organizers to bring in a local NGO, specializing  in developing self-help  water systems and focusing
on women's participation.  Since  water management  for the household is essentially  the responsibility
of women, the project recognized  that it was important to have women involved  in providing  the
service. This helped improve  the link between the beneficiaries of the project and the costs of
providing the desired services. Women  were trained as extension  workers and in community
organizing and development.  Both men and women were trained for the appropriate  maintenance  and
repair tasks. The local NGO motivated  village men and women to organize themselves  into water
committees, which were responsible  for maintenance  and repairs. By 1988, 135 village water
committees  existed, all of which  had women in the key position as treasurer. All of the pumps were
functioning. The project gave villagers assurance that the community  water  system would  be
effectively operated and maintained  while it increased the respect and acceptance  of women in public
decisionmaking.  In the project area, between 1985 and 1987, there was a 50 percent decline in
diarrhea and a 70 percent decline  in skin diseases (Narayan-Parker, 1988).  The project also resulted
in resource savings for both government  and the villages.
In Mirzapur, Bangladesh,  a similar PROWWESS  program helped to install hand pumps and
latrines. Again, the project was designed  to be community  based, with a strong emphasis  on
the.inclusion  of women. From the beginning,  women were involved in selecting  project sites and in
maintenance  of the systems. In the intervention  area, 148 Tara hand pumps were installed  (I for
every 33 inhabitants)  and 754 latrines (Aziz et. al, 1990). Ninety percent of the households  used the
hand pump for practically  all domestic  use compared to only 20 percent outside  the intervention  area.
Ninety-eight  percent of the adult population  said they used the latrines regularly. Within the
intervention area, there was a noticeable  decline in diarrhea and other water related diseases.20
D. Conclusion
Private sector involvement  and user participation in water resource management  are not new.
The examples  given demonstrate  the willingness  of the private sector and users to play a larger role in
water resources management  and improve water use. User participation  and private sector
involvement,  if properly structured, can provide the necessary incentives  for stabilizing  and improving
the efficiency  of irrigation  and water supply systems. It can add flexibility, transparency, and
accountability  as well as lessen the financial and administrative  burden on the State. For exarnple,
1989 World Bank review of twenty-one  impact  evaluations  of irrigatio;i  projects found cost recovery
to be excellent in those projects, in which water management  and O&M had been entrusted  to water
users (World Bank, 1980a).  Greater private sector and user participation  offers an effective means  to
increase user responsibility  for managing  and financing water projects while freeing governments  to
focus on broader water resource  management  concerns.
The examples  of decentralized  water management  in developing  country water supply and
irrigation systems points out several important  government activities. First, governments  will need to
play a more active role in regulating  the private sector exploitation  of groundwater  especially  for
irrigation. Second, the governments  will have to take measures  to  encourage  price competition
among private suppliers of water for both domestic and agricultural  users. Third, governments  should
play an active role in organizing  WUAs particularly for irrigation  and rural water supply systems  and
in providing  technical assistance.  As highlighted  in numerous examples, such activities should be
designed to reduce the transaction  costs of organizing and to establish a sense of assurance  and
accountability  within  the water user community.  Once this is done, the community  can deal with
problems associated with excludability  and unwillingness  to pay.21
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World Bank.Table 1.  Public and Private Goods  Market Power and Externalities in Water Systems
Nature of the  0ood  Market Power
Subtract-  Exclud-  Contest-  Externalidtis  C.r-nr,ert
ability  liry  ability
i.  Water SuOPly
A.  Piped
1. Trunk System (intake
pumpinq station)  Hi'  H  L  PH, GD  PG
2. Distribution  System  L  M  L  PH  PUG
3. Terminal Equipment
a. Common (i.e. handpump)  M  L  H  PH  SF,PUG
b. Individual (i.e. home
faucet)  M  H  H  PH  PG
S.  Village wells  M  L  H  PH  SF, PUG
C.  Vending (tanker trunks etc.)  H  H  H  PH  PG
II.  Irrigation
A.  Surface watar
1. Trunk System (dam, main
canal)  M1  M  L  WL, E  PUG
2. Distribution  System




a. Field to field irrigadon  H  L  H"  WL, ND, S  OAR
b. Individual farm  H  H  H-"  WL, ND, S  PG, HTC
4.  Terminal System
requiring lift  H  H  H"  WL, ND, S  PG
B.  Groundwater
1. Deep Tubewells
a. Pumping facilities  HZ'  H  M  GD  PG, OAR
b. Distribution  System  M  M  M  WL, S  PUG
c. Terminal System  H  H  H - WL, S  PG
2.  Shallow tubewells  Hi'  H  H  WL, S  PG, OAR
C.  Run of the River Systems
1.  Headworks  MY!  M  M  PUG
2.  Distribution  System  M1!  M  M  WL, S  PUG
3.  Terminal System  H  H  HI-'  WL, S.  PG, HTC
D.  Small dams and reservoirs
1. Headworks  M3'  M  M  PUG
2. Distribution  System  Mi!  M  M  WL, S  PUG
3. Terminal System  H  H  H-'  WL, S  PG, HTC
H  =  Public heaith  S  - Salinization.
WL  =  Water logging  E  =  Erosion during construction  & because of in-migration
GO  =  Groundwater depletion  L  - Low, M  - Medium end H  = High
NO  - introduction  of new diseases  HTC  = High transaction  costs for trades beyond the tertiary canal
SP  =  Difficult  to exclude users due to social factors  OAR  =  Open Access Resource
PUG  - Public Good Characteristics  PG  - Private Good
Source:  World  Bank Water Resourcos Management  Poiicy Paper, 1993  and Kessides, 1992.
1/  Function usually performed by private farmers.
2/  The degree of subtractability  associated with a given  well actually  depends on the nature of the aquifer from which the  w  1l  is drawv')G.
High water resource scarcity is assumed.
3/  The degree of subtractability  depends on the scarcity  of wwotr and the can.  zapacity.26
Abstract
Decentralizing  Water Resources  Management:
Economic  Incentives, Accountability  and Assurance
The fiscal crisis beginning  in the developing  world during the early 1980s  has highlighted  the
weakness  of a heavy dependence  on government  agencies for delivery of all water services.
Institutional  deficiencies  ad government  failure now over shadow many  of the traditional  market
failure concerns (externalities,  public good characteristics,  and monopoly  power).  The lack of
motivation  and accountability  of agency  staff, political interference, rent seeking, and inadequate
concern for user demands  have created a vicious cycle that starts with consumers  receiving  poor
service for which they are unwilling  to pay.  As a consequence,  water agencies do not receive
sufficient funds to maintain  the water delivery infrastructure  and prevent its deterioration  which
causes a further decline in service.
Decentralization  of service  delivery along with increased  participation  of water users has been
adopted by a number of countries  as a means to break out of this vicious cycle.  Private firms and
water user groups have been given control over system management  and in some cases, even
ownership. Service agreements,  long-term leases, and concessionaire  contracts have been used to
incorporate  of private sector efficiency  into the management  of specific water service activities  such
as meter reading, fee collection, and water delivery.  In agriculture, tubewell  development  by the
private sector has taken over the leadership in irrigation expansion.
The results are encouraging  as illustrations  from Asia, Latin America, and Africa show that water
system performance  can be improved  by decentralizing  service delivery.  Farmers have taken charge
of irrigation systems from the Ihilippines  and Indonesia  to Argentina  and Columbia. Private tubewell27
development  has been a major source for expanded food production in many parts of the developing
world, especially  South Asia.  Rural water supply systems in Kenya, developed  and managed  by
villagers, have reduced  the diarrhea by 50 percent and skin diseases by 70 percent.  Similar water
supply systems have signiiicantly  reduced diarrhea and other water related diseases in Bangladesh.
These successes in decentralized  water delivery are encourag;ng  other countries  to make similar
changes. This means a change in roles for many government agencies in water resources
management  to focus on: (1) regulating  the private sector over exploitation  of critical  groundwater
areas, (2) fostering  price competition  among water suppliers, (3) helping water users to organize, (4)
regulating land and water use practices that cause water pollution, and (5) providing  technical
assistance. Yet, for large investments  and main system operations  government  agencies  will continue
to play a direct role in water  development  and management.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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